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Trade mark dilution in Singapore: The 
aftermath of McDonald’s v MacTea 
David Llewelyn* 
Susanna H S Leong** 
In a unanimous decision delivered in September 2004, the Court of Appeal 
of Singapore has ruled against McDonald’s Corporation in its attempts to 
stop a small Singapore company, Future Enterprises Pty Ltd, from 
registering its marks “MacNoodles”, “MacTea” and “MacChocolate”. This 
case has international significance as the Singapore court ruled, confirming 
the position taken by courts in a number of other jurisdictions, that 
McDonald’s did not have an exclusive right over the prefix “Mc” in relation to 
food and beverages in the absence of deception or confusion. However, 
Singapore’s trade mark laws have since undergone a major revamp. Under 
the new laws, greater protection is accorded to well known marks. This 
paper studies the Singapore Court of Appeal’s decision in the McDonald’s 
case and comment on whether its result would have been different under 
the new laws. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
On 20 September 2004,1 in a unanimous decision Singapore’s highest court, the Court of Appeal, 
ruled against McDonald’s Corporation (McDonald’s), the world’s largest fast-food chain, in its bid to 
stop a local food company, Future Enterprises Pty Ltd (Future Enterprises) from registering its marks 
“MacNoodles”, “MacTea” and “MacChocolate”. The Court of Appeal’s decision ended a long-
running legal tussle lasting almost a decade. To many, the Court of Appeal’s decision in Singapore 
provides some welcome relief in the apparently never-ending attempts by trade mark owners to get 
broader and broader protection of well-known marks, even where those marks are as common as the 
“Mc” prefix. Whilst everyone would accept that within reason the better known a trade mark the more 
protection it should be accorded, it is the unreasoned headlong charge into disputes which the person 
in the street would treat with incredulity that ought to give both courts and policy makers some pause 
for thought and reflection about where the law of registered trade marks is going and in many 
countries has got to.  
 It is important to note that the case of McDonald’s Corp v Future Enterprises Pte Ltd [2005] 1 
SLR 177 (the McDonald’s case) was decided under the old Trade Marks Act (Cap 322, 1992 Rev Ed) 
(the old Act) because Future Enterprises’ applications for registration were made in 1995. Since then, 
Singapore’s registered trade mark protection regime has undergone a major revamp. In 1998, 2 
Singapore took a significant step when the old Act3 was repealed and a modern trade mark legislative 
 
* Director, IP Academy, Singapore; Visiting Professor, King’s College London; Partner, White & Case (London). 
** Assistant Professor, National University of Singapore. 
1 The Singapore Court of Appeal heard and dismissed the appellant’s, McDonald’s, appeal against the High Court’s decision on 
20 September 2004 and a written judgment was delivered by the court on 3 November 2004. See [2005] 1 SLR 177; [2004] 
SGCA 50. 
2 The Trade Marks Act 1998 was passed by Parliament on 26 November 1998 and assented to by the President on 11 December 
1998. 
3 The Trade Marks Act 1970, Singapore Statutes, Cap 332. 
Published in Australian Intellectual Property Journal, 2005, 16 (3), 138-151.
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framework introduced that accords with international standards.4 Under the Trade Marks Act 1998, 
the concept of a well-known mark was recognised by Singapore laws for the first time and owners of 
such marks can stop another party from registering or using an identical or similar mark in relation to 
identical, similar or even different goods or services for which the well-known mark has been 
registered, if the use is likely to cause confusion with the well-known mark in question. In today’s 
world of international trade and market-orientated economies, businesses are no longer merely 
supplying goods or services in their own domestic markets but are constantly looking out for new 
markets beyond their own shores. Trade marks and branding are increasingly identified by companies 
to be important components of their corporate strategy. The ability to protect one’s trade or service 
marks in foreign markets is a major concern for these businesses. In this connection, Singapore’s 
trade marks laws through the major legislative revamp in 1998 accord trade mark owners a high 
standard of protection. This high level of protection has been further enhanced by the recent Trade 
Marks (Amendment) Act 2004.5 In the case of trade marks well known to the public at large in 
Singapore, the recent amendments address the further concern of many businesses on the issue of 
dilution of their marks by blurring or tarnishment and the wrongful usurpation of their famous marks 
in foreign markets where they may not yet have a business presence or goodwill. As a result of these 
legislative changes, the scope of protection of registered trade marks in Singapore has been expanded 
significantly, in particular for well-known marks. 
 Returning to the McDonald’s case, one must ask what would have been the fate of McDonald’s if 
the new trade marks laws were applicable instead of the old law. Below we study the decision of the 
Court of Appeal in the McDonald’s case and comment on whether its result would have been 
different under the new laws. 
2. THE COURT OF APPEAL’S DECISION IN THE MCDONALD’S CASE 
The McDonald’s case concerned three applications made in 1995 to register as trade marks under the 
old Act the marks, “MacTea”, “MacChocolate” and “MacNoodles”, each with a stylised eagle device. 
The applicant, Future Enterprises, was a Singapore company which markets a range of instant food 
and beverage products using the “Mac” prefix, starting in 1994 with the “MacCoffee” 3-in-1 instant 
coffee mix.6 It is important to note that Mr Tan of Future Enterprises gave evidence that the reason he 
chose the prefix “Mac” was that he considered it to be a way used in English speaking countries of 
 
4 The Trade Marks Act 1998, Singapore Statutes, Cap 332, 1999 Rev Ed. The objectives of Parliament in enacting a new Trade 
Marks Act were (a) to simplify and modernise trade mark law; (b) to enable Singapore to meet its obligations under the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) and the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property (Paris Convention); and (c) to enable Singapore to accede to other international agreements concerning 
trade marks like the Protocol relating to the Madrid Agreement on the International Registration of Marks (Madrid Protocol). 
See “The Explanatory Statement, Trade Marks Bill”, Government Gazette, Bills Supplement Notification No B 42. 
5 The Trade Marks (Amendment) Act 2004 is one of the four Acts of Parliament enacted recently that relate to the protection of 
intellectual property rights. The other three Acts are the Patents (Amendment) Act, the Intellectual Property (Miscellaneous 
Amendments) Act and the Plant Varieties Protection Act. The enactment of these Acts is a result of a comprehensive review of 
intellectual property laws in Singapore with the aim of strengthening its intellectual property regime. Part of the review is also 
to fulfil Singapore’s obligations under the Intellectual Property Chapter of the US-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (USSFTA) 
signed on 6 May 2003. 
6 Future Enterprises’ MacCoffee is, somewhat surprisingly, a market leader in Russia, Kazakhstan and various other countries 
but not in Singapore. In fact, Future Enterprises had already had an unsuccessful skirmish in the Singaporean courts when it 
sued for passing off another local company which had launched its 3-in-1 instant coffee mix under the mark “A MaxCoffee“– 
[1998] 1 SLR 1012. Although the judge, Judith Prakash J, had no doubt that the defendant’s product had “been inspired by” 
and was “derived from” the packaging and name of Future Enterprises’ “MacCoffee” product, the plaintiff had no goodwill to 
protect in Singapore because there was no evidence before the court that any sales of “MacCoffee” had been made there at the 
relevant time which is the date of the launch of the defendant’s product. See Pontiac Marina Pte Ltd v CDL Hotels Int Ltd 
[1997] 3 SLR 726. Referring to the Budweiser (Anheuser Busch Inc v Budejovicky Budvar [1984] FSR 413) decision of the 
English Court of Appeal, she found that it was not enough for the plaintiff to show that it was incorporated in Singapore and 
manufactured the “MacCoffee” there. Thus, notwithstanding that the judge felt the similarity between the two products was 
high and it was likely that a substantial proportion of consumers would mistake one for the other, the action failed.  
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addressing people whose names were not known.7 Together with a design showing the American flag 
and a stylised eagle device, it was designed to make the product convey an American image and 
appeal. He then applied in Singapore to register as a trade mark the “MacCoffee” name together with 
the eagle device in Class 30 in respect of “instant coffee mix” and the application for registration was 
only granted in 1997. 
 In 1995, Future Enterprises applied to register as further members of its MAC range of instant 
products the three marks opposed by MacDonald’s, for tea, cocoa and noodles. MacDonald’s opposed 
on three separate grounds: 
1. That, contrary to s 12(1), the claim to proprietorship was not made in good faith as the applicant 
had copied the common descriptive prefix of McDonald’s family of marks, including 
McChicken, McNuggets, Egg McMuffin and, of course, McDonalds itself; 
2. That, contrary to s 15, registration would be likely to deceive or cause confusion to the public; 
and 
3. That, contrary to s 23(1), the applicant’s marks were identical with or nearly resembled the trade 
marks belonging to McDonald’s. 
 At first instance, the trial judge, Belinda Ang Saw Ean J, rejected all three grounds. Although  
she thought that Future Enterprises had indeed copied the McDonald’s naming system of a  
common prefix with a product descriptor, that was not something in which McDonald’s could claim 
rights. 
 On appeal, McDonald’s dropped their third ground of opposition but fared no better with the 
remaining two grounds. Chao Hick Tin JA, giving the judgment of the court (Yong Pung How CJ and 
Tan Lee Meng J concurring), rejected McDonald’s contention that anyone who uses the prefix “Mc” 
or the synonymous “Mac” as his mark on any food or beverage product, whether in an immediately 
consumable state or not, would be likely to cause confusion in the minds of the public that the latter 
product came from the same source as that of McDonald’s. Noting that the marks being applied for 
consisted of an integrated design comprising an eagle device and a smaller word component, although 
the eagle device itself had been required to be disclaimed,8 the Court of Appeal upheld the trial 
judge’s finding that no confusion with the opponent’s marks was likely to arise. 
 Having reviewed United States,9 Australian,10 Canadian11 and English12 authorities involving the 
McDonald’s family of marks, the court considered that it is not possible to reconcile all the cases but 
concluded that any consumer who went into a supermarket and when picking up the “MacTea” 
product thought that because of the “Mac” prefix it was connected with McDonalds “must be asinine” 
(at [60]).13 
 In the view of the court (at [63]), “to say that a person with ordinary common sense would, upon 
seeing a packet of ‘MacNoodles’ in a supermarket, with the eagle device and without the [golden 
 
7 See also McDonald’s Hamburgers Ltd v Burgerking (UK) Ltd [1986] FSR 45, where the strap line “It’s not just Big, Mac”, 
using Mac in the sense contended by Mr Tan, was held to arouse confusing associations with the claimant’s Big Mac product. 
8 Relying on Re Appln by Hardings Manufactures Pty Ltd (1987) 8 IPR 147 for the proposition that this did not mean that the 
disclaimed device should be ignored in deciding whether the marks are deceptively similar. 
9 McDonald’s Corp v McBagel’s Inc (McBagel) 649 F Supp 1268; 1 USPQ 2d 1761 (SDNY 1986) (85 Civ 7868, 10 December 
1986) and J&J Snack Foods Corp v McDonald’s Corp (McPretzel) 932 F 2d 1460; 18 USPQ 2d 1889 (US Court of Appeals, 
Fed Circuit, 17 May 1991). 
10 Opposition to Regn of the TM McMint (Australian TMO, Application/Registration No 616513, 7 November 1997) and 
Opposition to Regn of the TM McVeg (Australian TMO, Application/Registration No 646102, 10 December 1997). See the 
website of the Australian Trade Mark Office http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/resources/hearings.shtml#decisions. 
11 McDonald’s Corp v Silcorp Ltd (1989) 24 CPR (3d) 207 and McDonald’s Corp v Coffee Hut Stores Ltd (McBeans) (1994) 
CPR (3d) 463. 
12 In the matter of an Appln to Register McIndians (UK TM Regy, 16 August 1996) and Yuen Yu Kwan Frank v McDonald’s 
Corp (McChina) (High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, CH/2001/APP No 183, 27 November 2001, before Neuberger J 
(2001) WL 1422899. 
13 Noting that the law “assumes that every consumer will use ordinary care and intelligence”. 
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arches] logo or ‘McDonalds’ mark, think that the ‘MacNoodles’ is associated with [McDonalds] is 
really quite far-fetched” and (at [65]): 
with widespread education and a public which is constantly exposed to the world, either through travel 
or the media, one should be slow to think that the average individual is easily deceived or hoodwinked. 
In fact, the very success of the appellant, which is inseparable from its logo, is also the very reason 
why confusion is unlikely … Whilst we recognise that in oral communications the public will refer to 
FE’s products as “MacTea” rather than the “tea with the eagle device”, we think that whatever 
impression that may arise will evaporate immediately upon seeing the product in a supermarket. That is 
the critical moment. This is because a person with “MacTea” in mind will be seeing the actual product 
at the time of purchase and at that point he would not have failed to see the entire trade mark. If at all 
he had any thought that “MacTea” may be related to “McDonald’s”, that impression would have been 
expelled by then. 
 Clearly, the court would not have been minded to follow the type of analysis in the “initial 
interest confusion” line of cases decided by courts in the United States, mostly concerning the use of 
metatags on the internet,14 where such fleeting confusion (akin to association) has been found in 
certain cases to be sufficient to find infringement. One wonders also what would have been the 
Singapore court’s view of the judgment in the Court of Appeal of Northern Ireland in BP Amoco v 
John Kelly [2002] FSR 87 where initial confusion by the motorist approaching at speed a green petrol 
station which he then realised, apparently too late to continue on his way, was not a BP one was held 
sufficient to support a finding of infringement (of BP’s green trade mark)15 and passing off. This was 
despite the court accepting that a customer who was confused at the time of buying petrol would have 
to be “fairly stupid or fairly uncaring” (at [48]). By contrast, the Singapore Court of Appeal was firm 
in its view that no reasonable person could have been confused at the time of the buying decision and 
it was that point in time which is determinative of whether there is confusion sufficient to justify a 
finding of deceptive similarity (or, presumably, infringement). Although sensible from the traditional 
perspective that a trade mark is an indication of origin which plays its role in the economic process at 
the time of selection for purchase, courts in Europe have expanded the types (and times) of confusion 
which would justify a finding of infringement: for example, in the well-known case of Arsenal 
Football Club plc v Reed [2003] RPC 9,16 the English Court of Appeal was willing to take into 
consideration post-sale confusion and, as noted above, the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal  
accepted evidence of initial confusion dispelled by the time of purchase for all but the stupid or 
inattentive.  
 The Singapore court placed particular weight on the fact that, unlike other franchises such as 
Starbucks or Haägen-Dazs, McDonald’s does not sell its products in supermarkets and, even at the 
time of the hearing in 2004 (some eight years after the oppositions were first raised), McDonald’s 
products are always sold within its prominently branded restaurants and all were in a state to be 
consumed immediately by the purchaser. 
 
14 See, eg, Promatek v Equitrac 300 F 3d 808; 63 USPQ 2d 2018 (7th Cir, 13 August 2002, amended 18 October 2002) and 
Brookfield v West Coast 174 F 3d 1056; 50 USPQ 2d 1545 (9th Cir, 22 April 1999). 
15 Described as Pantone 348C. Of the defendant’s contention that it was unsure what exactly was the green which BP Amoco 
had registered, the court came to the surprising conclusion that a person searching the Register “could readily consult the TM3 
application forms” if he was unsure, at 98. Surely it cannot be correct that the Register is so unclear that reference need be 
made to other documents.  
16 In which the defendant trader who sold scarves and hats bearing the “Arsenal” name was found to have infringed the  
football club’s registered trade mark. Although the European Court of Justice had been asked specifically by the trial judge 
(Laddie J) to decide whether it was necessary for use of a sign by a defendant to be as an indication of source before there 
could be infringement, in an unsatisfactory judgment the court fudged its response to such an extent that counsel for the 
defendants were able to argue successfully, when the case came back before the trial judge for him to apply the law to  
the facts as he had found them, that the Court of Justice had exceeded its powers on an Art 234 EC Treaty reference  
from a national court (where its role is to answer the questions submitted by the national court but not to apply the law to  
the facts of the case, which is for the national court). However, the English Court of Appeal reversed the judgment on this 
point. 
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 But what about Mr Tan’s latest reason for the adoption of Mac: that it was taken from the stylish 
Apple Macintosh computer range he knew so well when Future Enterprises was in the computer 
business for the first decade of its existence? Surely, argued McDonald’s, this new story (remember it 
was the “Mac” greeting before) showed that there was bad faith and the applications should be 
rejected. No, said the principal assistant registrar in the IP Office of Singapore; no, said the trial 
judge; and no, said the Court of Appeal, referring to the English case Royal Enfield Trade Marks 
[2002] RPC 24 in which the Appointed Person found that such a claim should not be upheld unless it 
is distinctly proved and this will rarely be possible by a process of inference (per Simon Thorley QC 
at 516).  
 McDonald’s has lost but would its position be any different if the applicable law was the new 
trade marks law in Singapore?  
3. THE LEGAL POSITION OF MCDONALD’S AND OTHER PROPRIETORS OF 
WELL-KNOWN MARKS UNDER THE TRADE MARKS ACT 1998 AND THE 
RECENT 2004 AMENDMENTS 
A. Before the Trade Marks (Amendment) Act 2004 
Before the enactment of the Trade Marks (Amendment) Act 2004, s 2(7) of the Trade Marks Act 1998 
stated that whether a trade mark is well known in Singapore is a question to be answered taking into 
account “the extent to which the trade mark is known within the relevant sector of the public, whether 
as a result of the promotion of the trade mark or any other reason”. The Trade Marks Act 1998 
accords proprietors of trade marks that are well known in Singapore legal protection in the following 
respects:  
1. In the case of an earlier trade mark17 that is well known in Singapore – the right to object to and 
stop the registration of a later mark in accordance with the relative grounds for refusal of 
registration provided under s 8. This right to raise such an objection extends to cases in which the 
later mark is to be registered for goods or services which are not similar to those for which the 
earlier trade mark is protected if there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public as 
a result of such use.18 The proprietor of a well-known mark that is regarded as “an earlier trade 
mark” may also use the mark to invalidate the registration of a trade mark under s 23(3). 
2. In the case of a registered trade mark that is well-known in Singapore – the right to sue for 
infringement under s 27, and the extended protection under s 27(3)19 when a sign is used in the 
 
17 An “earlier trade mark” means (a) a registered trade mark or international trade mark (Singapore), the application for 
registration of which was made earlier than the trade mark in question, taking into account (where appropriate) the priorities 
claimed in respect of the trade marks; or (b) a trade mark which, at the date of application for registration of the trade mark in 
question or (where appropriate) of the priority claimed in respect of the application, was entitled to protection under the Paris 
Convention or the TRIPs Agreement as a well-known trade mark, and includes a trade mark in respect of which an application 
for registration has been made and which, if registered, would be an earlier trade mark by virtue of para (a) subject to its being 
so registered. See s 2(1), Trade Marks Act 1998. 
18 A trade mark which (a) is identical with or similar to an earlier trade mark; and (b) is to be registered for goods or services 
which are not similar to those for which the earlier trade mark is protected, shall not be registered if (i) the earlier trade mark is 
well known in Singapore; (ii) use of the later trade mark in relation to the goods or services for which the later trade mark is 
sought to be registered would indicate a connection between those goods or services and the proprietor of the earlier trade 
mark; (iii) there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public because of such use; and (iv) the interests of the 
proprietor of the earlier trade mark are likely to be damaged by such use. See s 8(3) of the Trade Marks Act 1998. 
19 Section 27(3) of the Trade Marks Act 1998 provides that a person infringes a registered trade mark which is well known in 
Singapore if: 
(a) without the consent of the proprietor of the trade mark, he uses in the course of trade a sign which is identical with or 
similar to the trade mark, in relation to goods or services which are not similar to those for which the trade mark is 
registered; 
(b) the use of the trade mark in relation to those goods or services would indicate a connection between goods or services 
and the proprietor and would be likely to cause confusion to the public; 
(c) there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public because of such use; and 
(d) the interests of the proprietor are likely to be damaged by such use. 
 Trade mark dilution in Singapore: The aftermath of McDonald’s v MacTea 
(2005) 16 AIPJ 138 143 ©  
course of trade in relation to goods or services that are not similar to those for which the well-
known mark is registered provided that there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the 
public as a result of the use.  
3. In the case of a well-known trade mark owned by a national of or resident domiciled in a country 
which is a party to the Paris Convention or a member of the World Trade Organisation, 
regardless of whether or not that person carries on business or has any goodwill in Singapore – 
the right to restrain by injunction the use in Singapore in the course of trade another trade mark 
which is identical or similar to the well-known mark in relation to identical or similar goods or 
services, provided the use is likely to cause confusion.20  
 A common theme running throughout the provisions on the scope of protection accorded to well-
known marks under the Trade Marks Act 1998 is the requirement for proof of a likelihood of 
confusion on the part of the public as a result of the use of the offending sign or mark. In this regard, 
it is important to note that the law continued to place strong emphasis on the protection of the 
consumer as the primary justification for the exclusive rights granted by the state in a trade mark. 
Consequently, before the 2004 amendments, well-known marks in Singapore were protected to the 
extent that the use of another identical or similar mark in relation to identical, similar or dissimilar 
goods or services created a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public. Under this protection 
regime, the focal point is on the nature of the defendant’s activities and their impact on consumers. 
With the change in the law after the Trade Marks (Amendment) Act 2004, the protection regime for 
well known marks in Singapore has moved from a model that primarily emphasises the nature of the 
defendant’s activities and their impact on consumers to a model that also takes into consideration the 
damage suffered by the trade mark proprietors and the distinctiveness of their marks as a result of the 
defendant’s activities.  
B. After the Trade Marks (Amendment) Act 2004 
As a result of the 2004 amendments, proprietors of well-known marks can now rely on an array of 
enhanced protective measures for their marks. The salient features of these enhanced legislative 
measures are as follows: 
1. An expanded definition of “well-known” marks. Compared to other trade marks, well-known 
trade marks are accorded additional enhanced protection. 
2. Proprietors of well-known marks can oppose the application for registration of an identical or 
similar later trade mark which is made on or after 1 July 2004 without the need to show a 
“likelihood of confusion” on the part of the public. All that has to be established by the proprietor 
is that use of the later trade mark by the third party would “indicate a connection between those 
goods or services and the proprietor of the earlier trade mark, and is likely to damage the interests 
of the proprietor of the earlier trade mark”.21 Proprietors of well-known marks can also prohibit 
the use of an identical or similar mark in the absence of proof of a likelihood of confusion on the 
part of the general public in relation to any goods. All that is required is proof that the use of the 
conflicting mark would indicate a connection between the third party and the proprietor of the 
well-known mark, which is likely to damage the interests of the owner.22 
3. The introduction of new anti-dilution rights. If the mark is well known to the public at large (as 
opposed to being well known only to a relevant sector of the public), the proprietor of the mark 
enjoys the additional protection of being able to restrain a third party’s use of any trade mark 
 
20 See s 55(1) and (2) of Trade Marks Act 1998. 
21 Section 8(3A)(a) and (b)(i). It is interesting to note that s 8(3A) is silent on the category of goods, whether “identical or 
similar”, “not similar”, “any goods”, and merely makes a reference to “the goods or services for which the later trade mark is 
sought to be registered” in s 8(3A)(b). It is suggested that the wording in the section is wide enough to support a statutory 
interpretation that the category of goods referred to is “any goods”. 
22 Section 55(3)(a). It is important to note that in the case of the use of an identical or similar mark but in relation to identical or 
similar goods or services, s 55(2) of the amended Trade Marks Act 1998 provides that an injunction can be granted to the 
proprietor of a well-known mark if the use is likely to cause confusion. 
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which is identical or similar to the proprietor’s well-known mark in relation to any goods or 
services which would “cause dilution in an unfair manner” or “take unfair advantage” of the 
distinctive character of the trade mark.23 
4. For marks that are well known to the public at large, dilution may be used as the basis for an 
opposition to an application for registration of an identical or a similar trade mark which is made 
on or after 1 July 2004 in relation to goods or services for which the later trade mark is sought to 
be registered, if it can be established that the registration of the latter would “cause dilution in an 
unfair manner” or “take unfair advantage” of the distinctive character of the earlier well-known 
trade mark.  
5. The introduction of the concept of “business identifiers”.24 The anti-dilution rights referred to in 
(3) and (4) above also extend to the illegitimate use of business identifiers by third parties.25 
C. Well-known marks and the new anti-dilution rights in Singapore 
By the Trade Marks (Amendment) Act 2004, the relatively simple definition of a well-known mark in 
Singapore provided under s 2 of the Trade Marks Act 1998 has been replaced by a substantially more 
detailed provision26 that lays down new criteria for determining whether a trade mark is well known 
in Singapore. Clause 2(f) of the Trade Marks (Amendment) Act 2004 defines a well-known mark to 
include both registered and unregistered trade marks that are well known in Singapore. In the case of 
unregistered trade marks, the marks must belong to a national or a resident of a country which is a 
party to the Paris Convention or a member of the World Trade Organisation and it is irrelevant 
whether the mark owner carries on business or has any goodwill in Singapore. This undoubtedly 
provides a useful tool for a foreign trade mark owner who has not registered in Singapore to prevent 
infringing use in the Singapore market. Such a right was not previously available under Singapore 
law. 
 The criteria for determining whether a mark is well known in Singapore or not are listed in the 
new s 2(7) of the Trade Marks Act 1998 and they include the following relevant matters, amongst any 
other matter from which it may be relevant to infer that the mark is well known: 
1. The degree of knowledge or recognition of the mark by the relevant sector of the public in 
Singapore; 
2. The duration, extent and geographical area of any use of the mark; 
3. The duration, extent and geographical area of any promotion of the mark, including advertising 
or publicity; 
4. The duration and geographical area of any registrations or applications for registration, of the 
mark, to the extent that they reflect use or recognition of the mark; 
5. The record of successful enforcement of rights in the mark, in particular the extent to which the 
mark was recognised as well known by competent authorities; and 
6. The value associated with the mark. 
 The amended s 2(7) of the Trade Marks Act 1998 is based on Art 2(1)(b) of the Joint 
Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks adopted by the 
Assembly of the Paris Union for the Protection of Industrial Property and the General Assembly of 
 
23 Section 55(3), amended Trade Marks Act 1998. 
24 A “business identifier” is defined as “any sign capable of being represented graphically which is used to identify any 
business”. See cl 2 of the Trade Marks Amendment Act 2004. 
25 Section 55(4)(a) and (b), amended Trade Marks Act 1998. 
26 The amended s 2 of the Trade Marks Act 1998 gives effect to Art 16.1.2(b)(i) of the United States of America-Singapore 
Free Trade Agreement (USSFTA) read with Art 2 of the Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of 
Well-Known Marks adopted by the Assembly of the Paris Union for the Protection of Industrial Property and the General 
Assembly of the World Intellectual Property Organization in 1999 (the Joint Recommendation).  
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the World Intellectual Property Organisation in 1999 (the Joint Recommendation) which lists the 
factors for determination of whether a mark is a well-known mark in a member state. 
 After the 2004 Amendments, there are essentially two categories of well-known marks in 
Singapore: (a) trade marks that are well known to any relevant sector of the public in Singapore;27 and 
(b) trade marks that are well known to the public at large in Singapore. With regard to trade mark 
proprietors in the latter category, the law now accords their trade marks an additional level of 
protection in the form of anti-dilution rights. However, there is no definition of the meaning of  
“well known to the public at large” in Singapore in the amended provisions of the Trade Marks Act 
1998. It is submitted that in the absence of a definitive statutory definition, the issue of whether  
a mark, registered or unregistered, is well known to the public at large in Singapore is then a  
question of fact to be established on a case-by-case basis and the burden should be on the  
proprietor of the mark making such an assertion. The factors listed in the amended s 2(7) of the  
Trade Marks Act 1998 would undoubtedly be relevant pointers for the courts to consider and 
references to results from market surveys conducted by the parties would also be helpful. It  
must be borne in mind that recognition should not itself be sufficient, it is well known as a trade 
mark which should be tested. Given the small size of the Singapore market, it is perhaps not  
difficult to establish a reputation at large but whether it is recognised as a trade mark is the critical 
question.  
 In the case of fast food giant McDonald’s, it would not be difficult to adduce substantial evidence 
to show that McDonald’s is a mark that is well known to the public at large in Singapore. If this is so, 
McDonald’s will be entitled to the enhanced trade mark protection in the form of the new anti-
dilution rights in ss 8(3A), 55(3) and 55(4) of the amended Trade Marks Act 1998. 
Would cause dilution in an unfair manner of the distinctive character of the mark 
“Dilution” in relation to a trade mark in Singapore is defined by the amended s 2(1) of the Trade 
Marks Act 1998 to mean: 
the lessening of the capacity of the trade mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless 
of whether there is  
(a) any competition between the proprietor of the trade mark and any other party; or  
(b) any likelihood of confusion on the part of the public.  
(emphasis added) 
The Singapore definition of dilution is modelled on the relevant (and much maligned) provision in the 
United States Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1996 (FTDA) which reads: 
the term “dilution” means the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish 
goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of  
(1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or  
 
27 The list of criteria in the new s 2(7) of the Trade Marks Act 1998 encompasses both national and international recognition of 
a mark as determining factors of whether the mark is well known or not in Singapore. Both national and international 
recognition of a mark are given equal weightings in the equation of whether the mark is well known or not in Singapore. 
Accordingly, a mark that has gained international recognition must still be recognised by the relevant sector of the public in 
Singapore before it can be considered well known in Singapore, even though international recognition of the mark is on a 
balance of probabilities a good indication that it is also well known domestically. The “relevant sector of the public in 
Singapore” is fairly widely defined in the new s 2(8) of the Trade Marks Act and includes any of the following groups: (a) all 
actual or potential customers in Singapore of the goods or services bearing the mark; (b) all people involved in the distribution 
channels in Singapore of the goods or services bearing the mark; and (c) all businesses and companies in Singapore dealing 
with the goods or services bearing the mark. This definition of “the relevant sector of the public in Singapore” mirrors that in 
Art 2(2)(a) of the Joint Recommendation. According to such a definition, the recognition of a mark nationally is not limited to 
the retail or consumer market in Singapore but also extends to persons involved in the distribution channels and that of the 
business or corporate circles. In fact, a mark would still have obtained the necessary national recognition even if the products or 
services bearing the mark are not being sold in the Singapore retail market but are merely imported into Singapore for re-export 
as long as the importers, being the relevant sector of the public in Singapore, recognise or know that the mark is a well-known 
mark.  
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(2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.28  
 A few points may be noted with regard to the definition of dilution in the Singapore context. 
First, according to the definition, dilution of a trade mark may occur even when confusion on the part 
of the general public is absent. Second, dilution of a trade mark is not restricted to non-competing 
goods and can also cover competing goods. Third, by defining dilution to mean a lessening of the 
capacity of the well-known mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, the section in the 
amended Trade Marks Act 1998 contemplates the lessening of the ability of the well-known mark to 
function as a trade mark at all. However, the definition of dilution in s 2 of the amended Trade Marks 
Act 1998 must be read together with the operative anti-dilution provisions in s 55(3A), which gives 
the proprietor of a mark that is well known at large a right to restrain by injunction if the use the third 
party’s conflicting trade mark would cause dilution in an unfair manner of the distinctive character of 
the proprietor’s trade mark or would take unfair advantage of the distinctive character of the 
proprietor’s trade mark. It should be noted that in s 55(3A), the effect of the third party’s use of the 
conflicting trade mark is focused on the distinctive character of the well-known mark, whereas in the 
definition in s 2 the focal point is on the well-known mark’s ability to function as a badge of origin or 
source. Therefore, in order for the proprietor of the well-known mark to be able to rely on the anti-
dilution provisions, the meaning of dilution needs to be interpreted in such a way that the proprietor 
must show that the third party’s use of the conflicting mark is unfair and has the effect of lessening 
the distinctive character of the well-known mark. Experience elsewhere suggests that this is no easy 
task.  
 Legal jurisprudence in Europe and in the United States has essentially categorised dilution into at 
least two broad categories: (a) blurring and (b) tarnishment. Dilution by blurring is often described by 
the courts as the “whittling away” of a well-known mark’s distinctiveness.29 Dilution by tarnishment 
on the other hand refers to the degradation of a mark’s positive image or associations when it is used 
in relation to goods or services of an inferior quality, or of an immoral or obscene nature. There is 
seemingly a third category of dilution and this has often been termed as “genericide”. Genericide 
occurs when a trade mark is transformed as a result of indiscriminate usage into a generic mark and 
consequently loses its power as a source identifier.  
 Referring to the statutory definition of “dilution” in s 2 of the amended Trade Marks Act 1998, it 
may be noted that it is easy to fit the concepts of dilution by blurring and genericide into the  
language of the statute as they both entail a reduction or lessening of the mark’s distinctiveness  
or ability to function as a source identifier. Dilution by tarnishment is a little trickier. It has been  
said that “a tarnishing use may take advantage of the fame of the trade mark, but it normally  
does not seek to diminish the ability of the famous mark to distinguish goods or services”. 30 
Consequently, an argument can be made that dilution by tarnishment is not a category of  
dilution encompassed by the definition in s 2 of the amended Trade Marks Act 1998. However, in the 
United States, most federal courts have taken the view that the FTDA definition, which is  
in para materia to the Singapore definition, incorporates the concept of dilution by tarnishment.  
Even if the Singapore courts should find that the statutory definition of dilution does not  
incorporate the concept of dilution by tarnishment, a tarnishing use of a well-known mark is arguably 
a use which would take unfair advantage of the mark and therefore a case for dilution by tarnishment 
may be successfully argued under the second limb of the new anti-dilution provisions in the Act 
instead.  
 Nevertheless, the categorisation of the forms of dilution does not provide a clear structure or 
analytical framework under which diluting uses may be separated from non-diluting ones. This is 
probably because little empirical work has been done to study the process by which a distinctive mark 
 
28 See Lanham Act, s 45; 15 USC, s 1127.  
29 The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition 25, comment e, describes blurring in terms of lessening “the distinctiveness 
and selling power” of the mark. See also the courts’ description of dilution by blurring in cases such as Nabisco, Inc v PF 
Brands, Inc 191 F 3d 208 at 214, 51 USPQ 2d 1882 (2d Cir 1999) and Deere & Co v MTD Products, Inc 41 F 3d 39 at 43; 32 
USPQ 2d 1936 (2d Cir 1994).  
30 See Welkowitz DS, Trade Mark Dilution – Federal, State and International Law (BNA Books, 2002) p 234. 
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is turned into a mark of little distinction as a result of third party uses. In a frequently cited 
description of dilution, it has been said that: 
Dilution is an injury that differs materially from that arising out of the orthodox confusion. Even in the 
absence of confusion, the potency of a mark may be debilitated by another’s use. This is the essence of 
dilution. Confusion leads to immediate injury, while dilution is an infection which, if allowed to 
spread, will inevitably destroy the advertising value of the mark.31  
(emphasis added)  
The test for dilution: Actual dilution v likelihood of dilution 
The issue of how dilution may be shown, as in the test for the cause and effect of a third party’s use of 
the conflicting mark on the well-known mark, is one that has split the courts in the United States, a 
jurisdiction in which hundreds of reported cases before both trial and appellate courts deal with the 
interpretation and application of trade mark dilution laws. Until the resolution of this issue by the 
Supreme Court in the 2003 case of Moseley v V Secret Catalogue, Inc 537 US 418 at 123 S Ct 1115 
(2003) (Victoria’s Secret case), the lower courts in the United States were divided into those that 
utilised an actual dilution analysis and the others that adopted the likelihood-of-dilution analysis. The 
operative section in the FTDA reads: 
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled … to an injunction against another person’s commercial 
use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use … causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the 
mark.32  
(emphasis added) 
 According to the school that advocates an actual dilution analysis, the proprietors of a famous 
mark will be entitled to an injunction only if they can prove an actual, present harm to their mark, 
measured by loss of revenue or a consumer survey, instead of a mere likelihood of harm.33 The 
reasons cited by the courts adopting this approach include a plain meaning approach to the 
interpretation of the section without any distortion to the legislative language; that if Congress had 
intended otherwise, simpler and clearer language would have been adopted; that such an approach 
would prevent a mark from becoming a “property-right-in-gross” and that Congress has opted for 
“use” instead of “threatened use” in the section. 
 On the other hand, courts in the Sixth, Seventh and Second Circuits have disagreed with the 
actual harm requirement. One of these courts has found the actual harm requirement to be overly 
restrictive, holding “plaintiffs to an impossible level of proof”.34 Others have doubted the correctness 
of applying the plain meaning approach to interpreting the section as it leads to a conclusion that 
defeats the intent of the statute and have also doubted the availability of evidence of actual harm in 
the majority of cases. They concluded that Congress could not have intended to create an anti-dilution 
right requiring such a level of proof. Consequently, these courts have found that a proof of actual 
harm is not necessary and that a preliminary injunction may be granted to prevent a threatened harm 
to the distinctive quality of the famous mark. In 2003, the Supreme Court in the Victoria’s Secret 
decision held that proof of actual dilution and not mere likelihood of injury is required and the 
divergence in views in the lower courts was finally resolved. On 19 April 2005 the House of 
Representatives of the United States Congress passed the Trademark Dilution Revision Act (Revision 
Act) to try and remedy what some viewed to be the overly formalistic interpretation by the Supreme 
Court. The Revision Act: 
 
31 Mortellito v Nina of Cal, Inc 335 F Supp 1288 at 1296, 173 USPQ 346 (SDNY 1972). 
32 15 USC s 1125(c)(1). 
33 Cases in this category include Ringling Bros-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc v Utah Division of Travel Development 
170 F 3d 449; 50 USPQ 2d 1065 (4th Cir); 528 US 923 (1999); Westcher Media v PRL USA Holdings 214 F 3d 658 at 671; 55 
USPQ 2d 1225 (5th Cir 2000); Cable News Network, LP v cnnews.com 177 F Supp 2d 506 at 522; 61 USPQ 2d 1331 (ED Va 
2001); and American Cynamid Co v Nutraceutical Corp 54 F Supp 2d 379 (DNJ 1999).  
34 See Eli Lilly & Co v Natural Answers, Inc 233 F 3d 456 at 468; 56 USPQ 2d 1942 (7th Cir 2000). 
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• Effectively overturns the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in the Victoria’s Secret case, 
so that action may now be taken “regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely 
confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury” (see s 2, Revision Act amending 
s 43(c)(1) of the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 USC 1125) on Injunctive Relief);  
• Introduces a more stringent test for famous marks, stating that a “mark is famous if it is widely 
recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the 
goods or services of the mark’s owner” (see s 2, Revision Act amending s 43(c)(2) of the 
Trademark Act of 1946 (15 USC 1125) on Definitions);  
• Introduces definitions of both “blurring” (association arising from the similarity between a mark 
or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark) and 
“tarnishment” (association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a 
famous mark that harms the reputation of the famous mark);  
• Changes the defences to dilution, including by removing the defence for “non-commercial use of 
the mark”, replacing it with “fair use of a famous mark by another person, other than as a 
designation of source for the person’s goods or services, including for purposes of identifying 
and parodying, criticizing, or commenting upon the famous mark owner or the goods or services 
of the famous mark owner” (see s 2, Revision Act amending s 43(c)(3) of the Trademark Act of 
1946 (15 USC 1125) on Exclusions). 
 A similar standard of proof to that required by the United States Supreme Court in the Victoria’s 
Secret case also appears to be imposed on proprietors of marks with a reputation in the United 
Kingdom when they seek to rely on trade mark dilution rights to oppose the use of identical or similar 
marks by third parties on dissimilar goods. One of the three grounds available to such a proprietor in 
s 5(3) of the United Kingdom Trade Marks Act 1994 (as amended) is to show that the use of the later 
mark would be detrimental to the repute of the earlier mark with a reputation. Under this category, 
which imports the notion of dilution by tarnishment, the Office of Harmonisation for the Internal 
Markets (OHIM) has ruled that the proprietor must show that the unauthorised use of the mark by a 
third party will have the actual effect of causing damage to the reputation of the mark; a mere 
likelihood of damage would not be sufficient. 
 Another of the three grounds available to such a proprietor under s 5(3) of the United Kingdom 
Trade Marks Act 1994 is to show that the use of the later mark would be detrimental to the distinctive 
character of the earlier mark with a reputation. To successfully establish detriment to the distinctive 
character of the mark with a reputation, the United Kingdom Trade Mark Registry35 requires the 
proprietor to establish that the distinctiveness of his or her mark in relation to those goods or services 
that the public has come to associate with the proprietor has been diminished by third party use. In the 
McDonald’s case, the analysis would take the form of assessing whether the use of the “MacTea”, 
“MacChocolate’ and the “MacNoodles” trade marks on a range of instant food and beverage products 
sold in supermarkets would be detrimental to the goodwill created in the McDonald’s mark in the sale 
of food and beverages at its fast food outlets. The conclusion would probably be no, especially if no 
confusion can be found. As a result of this relatively restrictive approach, the United Kingdom 
Registry has on more than one occasion declined to find dilution through blurring.36 Thus, it has been 
argued that the United Kingdom Registry’s approach appears to have “reincorporated a confusion 
requirement into the concept of detriment”37 and indeed as a matter of practice it is difficult to 
persuade either the Registry or the courts that there is detriment in the absence of some (however 
slight) evidence of confusion.  
 In Singapore, it can be argued that the legislature has designed a clearer model of trade mark 
dilution protection with its different wording. A comparison of the language of the Singapore anti-
dilution provisions and that of the United States of America leads one to conclude that in Singapore, 
the legislature appears to have removed the ambiguity found in the provision of the FTDA by 
including the word “would” in the Singapore sections. The language in s 8(3A) and s 55(3) and (4) of 
 
35 Oasis Stores’ Trade Mark Application [1998] RPC 631 at 649. 
36 Oasis Stores’ Trade Mark Application [1998] RPC 631 and Audi-Med Trade Mark [1998] RPC 863. 
37 Bently and Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (Oxford University Press, 2001) p 834. 
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the amended Trade Marks Act 1998 is clear and more definitive compared to its American equivalent 
and it is clear that in Singapore, the proprietor of a well-known mark has to prove actual harm instead 
of threatened harm before being entitled, based on the anti-dilution provisions, to oppose the 
registration or restrain the use by a third party of a conflicting mark. It appears that the new anti-
dilution right introduced by the amendments is reserved for a special group of elite marks and the 
burden of proof to be discharged by the proprietors of this group of marks is a heavy one. Considering 
the restrictive scope of this anti-dilution limb in Singapore, McDonald’s would still have an uphill 
task in establishing that there has been dilution in an unfair manner of the distinctive character of its 
trade mark by FE’s “Mac” family.  
Taking unfair advantage of the distinctive character of the mark 
Proprietors of well-known marks which are well known to the public at large can also restrain the use 
and/or oppose the registration of an identical or similar mark if the use of the conflicting mark by the 
third party would take unfair advantage of the distinctive character of the well-known mark.38 It is  
not clear what “unfair advantage” refers to in the section. The section does not give any further 
elaboration on the uses, activities or practices on the part of a third party that are considered to  
take an “unfair advantage” of the well-known mark. However, it is arguable (and no doubt will be 
argued) that by the language in this section, it is intended to encompass a whole range of uses, 
activities or practices possibly dealt with under unfair competition laws. An example of the type of 
practices most probably envisaged by this section is free-riding39 by a third party on the goodwill or 
reputation of the well-known mark (perhaps along the lines of the Pub Squash case [1981] RPC 429 
which was found by the Privy Council not to constitute passing off because there was no 
misrepresentation). 
 In the United Kingdom (and EU generally), protection is given to marks with a reputation if the 
third party use takes advantage of or is detrimental to the distinctive character of the mark. Therefore, 
it may be useful to refer to the United Kingdom experience in any consideration of the Singaporean 
equivalent: what constitutes “an unfair advantage of the distinctive character” of the mark? A few 
important points may be gleaned from the United Kingdom cases. First, the unfair advantage or 
benefit taken by the third party use of the mark must be shown to be “significant”.40 The intention 
behind the third party’s misappropriation of the value of the mark, though determinative, is 
nevertheless likely to be an important factor to consider and whether the third party stands to gain 
substantially from the use of the mark becomes a relevant question to consider. Second, a fleeting 
“non-origin” association between the third party’s sign and the mark in question is not sufficient to 
constitute a taking of an unfair advantage of the distinctive character of the mark. One case went so 
far as to decide41 that to show unfair advantage, it is necessary to establish some specific conceptual 
association between the reputation of the earlier mark and the goods in respect of which the sign  
is to be used. In the case of Inlima SL’s Application [2000] ETMR 325, the opponent, Adidas,  
was successful in establishing a “sporting connection” between the trade mark applicant’s shape  
mark which bore the opponent’s famous “three-stripe mark”, leading to the conclusion that 
consumers would be likely to believe that the applicant and the opponent were somehow connected in 
trade. 
 In another case, Mulhens GmbH v The Hearst Corp R552/2000-4 (Cosmopolitan 
Cosmetics/Cosmopolitan), the proprietor of the mark Cosmopolitan successfully opposed the 
application to register Cosmopolitan Cosmetics for cosmetics on the ground that the third party’s use 
 
38 Similar legislative language is found in Art 5(2) of the 1988 EC Trade Mark Directive and the relevant portion of the Article 
reads: “Any Member State may also provide that the proprietor [of a registered trade mark] shall be entitled to prevent all third 
parties not having his consent from using in the course of trade any sign which is identical with, or similar to, the trade mark in 
relation to goods or services which are not similar to those for which the trade mark is registered, where the latter has a 
reputation in the Member State and where use of that sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the 
distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark” (emphasis in original). 
39 An example of free-riding is given by Advocate General Jacobs in Adidas-Salomon AG v Fitnessworld Trading Ltd [2003] 1 
CMLR 14 when he spoke about the use of the mark Rolls Royce to sell whisky.  
40 Oasis Stores’ Trade Mark Application [1998] RPC 631 at 649. 
41 Oasis Stores’ Trade Mark Application [1998] RPC 631 at 649. 
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of the later mark was bound to benefit from the reputation of the earlier mark for female fashion and 
style. But, in Audi-Med Trade Marks [1998] RPC 863, the opponent Audi’s claim that the registration 
of Audi-Med for hearing aids, on the ground that it would take unfair advantage of the distinctive 
character of the Audi mark for cars based on an association of Audi with high technology, was 
rejected by the Registry. The Registry found that even though Audi was a mark of reputation, the 
reputation was not easily transferred from cars to hearing aids. Furthermore, the Registry cautioned 
that when the marks in dispute were ordinary as opposed to invented words, it would be even more 
difficult to establish an “unfair advantage” because in this situation, it becomes less clear whether the 
third party is merely taking an advantage of words in the public domain or whether the third party is 
taking an unfair advantage of the distinctive character of the opponent’s mark.  
 Thus, in the McDonald’s case, two main obstacles would have stood in the way of establishing 
“unfair advantage”: (a) a specific conceptual association of the McDonald’s reputation with the range 
of instant noodles and beverages sold under FE’s marks in the supermarkets; (b) that the prefix 
Mc/Mac is a common surname or form of address in the English-speaking world. For (a), the Court of 
Appeal in Singapore ruled that such an association was absent and for (b), the evidence of FE’s main 
witness, Mr Tan, is probably determinative in establishing whether FE’s choice of marks was 
motivated mainly by seeking to “rub off” the reputation of McDonald’s in the selling of its products 
in supermarkets. As we have seen in the foregoing paragraphs, the Court of Appeal found that, in the 
absence of clear proof, bad faith on the part of FE had not been established. On the strength of these 
findings, it is unlikely that the courts in Singapore would be persuaded to find “unfair advantage” on 
the basis of the facts in the McDonald’s case.  
4. CONCLUSION  
With the recent changes in the Singapore trade mark laws, proprietors of well-known trade marks 
such as McDonald’s do have significant cause to celebrate. There is undoubtedly an expansion in the 
protection accorded to well-known marks. Protection against trade mark dilution as an added form of 
protection for a special elite class of marks which are well known to the public at large has now been 
introduced in Singapore. However, even with all these changes to the law, it remains doubtful 
whether McDonald’s would have succeeded. In the absence of a likelihood of confusion and in the 
absence of clear authority that it is not only point of sale confusion that is relevant, even with the 
broader scope of infringement for marks that are well known to the public at large, McDonald’s 
would find it difficult to persuade a court, at least in Singapore, that dilution by blurring or unfair 
advantage was likely to result from MacTea, MacNoodles or MacChocolate. Furthermore, given the 
nature of the relatively common prefix that McDonald’s is trying to remove from large swathes of the 
commons of commerce, this surely is the correct result. The conceptual problem (and one with which 
the courts must grapple) is that at the heart of the increased scope of protection the law now accords 
to well-known or famous marks,42 or even marks with a reputation,43 lies the paradox that in many 
cases the better known a mark is the less the difference a third party needs in its sign to avoid  
in the actual marketplace any confusion or indeed, at the outer edges, anything other than the most 
fleeting association. Then, when one is forced into the woolly areas of dilution by blurring or 
tarnishment, taking unfair advantage or detrimental use, many courts have shown themselves 
unwilling to accede to protection in the absence of confusion except in the very unusual cases.44 
 
42 In Singapore, the 2004 amendments to the Trade Marks Act 1998 give to well-known marks protection against use of a sign 
which would cause dilution in an unfair manner of the distinctive character of the well-known trade mark; or would take unfair 
advantage of the distinctive character of the well-known trade mark. 
43 For example, under s 10(3) of the UK Trade Marks Act 1994, such marks are generally protected against third party use 
which is detrimental to their distinctive character or which takes unfair advantage of their renown.  
44 In Moseley v V Secret Catalogue, Inc 537 US 418; 123 S Ct 1115 (2003), although the US Supreme Court acknowledged that 
the Victoria’s Secret trade mark was a valuable and famous trade mark and that consumers made a mental association when 
seeing the two trade marks, Victoria’s Secret and Victor’s Little Secret, it held that the mental association, by itself, was not 
enough to prove trade mark dilution. In order to prove dilution, the court held that the trade mark owner must demonstrate 
harm in the form of either tarnishment (that the association causes consumers to think less of the trade mark) or blurring (that 
the association makes the famous trade mark less distinguishable from other brand names). Thus evidence must be adduced to 
demonstrate that consumers (or the relevant public) actually believed that the mark was tarnished or blurred by the second use.  
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Indeed, most neutral observers will agree that the concept of dilution as a form of trade mark 
infringement is one which is fraught with doctrinal and practical difficulties. The exact scope of a 
trade mark dilution claim remains fuzzy and amorphous. Although the dust of the McDonald’s case 
has settled, new winds of uncertainties relating to trade mark dilution can be expected to blow on 
Singapore soil.  
 Considering everything in perspective, the only conclusion is that the battle against trade mark 
dilution in Singapore is far from over. In fact, it has only just begun.  
 
